Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1991

The Trouble with Legal Ethics
William H. Simon
Columbia Law School, wsimon@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons

Recommended Citation
William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/885

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

The Trouble With Legal Ethics
William H. Simon

Legal ethics is a disappointing subject. From afar, it seems exciting; it
promises to engage the central normative commitments that make lawyering a profession and that account for much of the nonpecuniary appeal of
the lawyer's role. Thus, when people see public spirit among lawyers
threatened by commercial self-seeking, they often prescribe increased
attention to the teaching and -discussion of legal ethics as a remedy.'
But close up, legal ethics usually turns out to be dull and dispiriting. At
most law schools, students find the course in legal ethics or professional
responsibility boring and insubstantial, and faculty dread having to teach it.
Bar association ethics discussions rarely generate interest over the kind of
basic questions of value that the view from afar associates with legal ethics.
The reason that legal ethics is so consistently disappointing is that the
prevailing conceptions of the subject fail to respond to the aspirations that
draw people to it.
There are two prevailing conceptions of legal ethics or professional
responsibility. The first conflates legal ethics with the disciplinary rules of
the codes-rules promulgated under state-delegated authority and enforced by punitive sanctions. Under this conception, the subject might
better be called "Regulation of Lawyers," a name in fact used by one of the
legal ethics textbooks, 2 in the same way that the study of the. rules
governing the practice of transportation companies is called "Regulation of
Common Carriers." The second conception conflates legal ethics with the
private or personal moralities of individual lawyers. Here the core concerns
are the constraints of role on self-expression and the legitimacy of requiring
the individual lawyer to perform actions in role that conflict with her
personal values.3
The disciplinary rule conception is the dominant one among lawyers and
law teachers. Most law school courses and bar association discussions of
legal ethics are devoted largely to such rules. The professional responsibility component of bar exams consists entirely of a test of such rules. The
personal morality conception is the dominant one among philosophers and
psychologists concerned with lawyering, and it has influenced a minority of
William H. Simon is Professor of Law, Stanford University.
1. See, e.g.," . . . In the Spirit of Public Service": Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, ABA Comm. on Professionalism (1986).
2. Stephen Gillers & Norman Dorsen, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics
(Boston, 1985).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dvorkin, Jack Himmelstein & Howard Lesnick, Becoming a Lawyer:
Problems of Law and Ethics (St. Paul, Minn., 1978); Gary Bellow & Bea Moulton, The
Lawyering Process: Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy (Mineola, N.Y., 1978).
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law teachers and practitioners as well, including most of those with the
more original and ambitious approaches to legal ethics. These people try to
help lawyers become more self-conscious and articulate about their personal values and to provide some psychological support for such values
against the pressures of role.
Each of these conceptions disappoints an important part of the expectations that lead people to legal ethics or professional responsibility. The
trouble with the disciplinary rule conception is that it does not have much
to do with ethics or responsibility; the trouble with the personal morality
conception is that there is nothing especially legal or professional about it.
The first treats legal ethics as merely a set of rules; the second as purely
individual values.
But one of the most distinctive and appealing implications of the ideal of
professional role is that professional practice is simultaneously a form of
social commitment and self-expression. In theory this happens because the
practitioner is personally committed to the profession's norms, but also
more fundamentally, because he participates in elaborating them. The
most important participation occurs not through the formal organizational
processes of the bar but through the lawyer's day-to-day practice in the
form of a distinctive kind ofjudgment. As the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility puts it, the "essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his
educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to the
specific legal problem of the client."'4
Because the general legal norms do not mechanically apply themselves
to specific circumstances, this judgment requires creative effort. Because
the general norms express the normative commitments of the legal system
and the profession, the effort to apply them to specific circumstances can be
experienced as direct participation in the normative life of the community.
This type of creative, normatively charged judgment is the distinctive
ethical component of the ideal of professionalism. In my view, it accounts
for the moral appeal of the lawyering role. The attractive implication of this
notion of professionalism is that lawyers, notjust in exceptional moments of
public service, but in their everyday practice, participate directly in furtheringjustice.
The idea of professional judgment as a complex and creative effort to
apply general values to particular circumstances is more or less taken for
granted by lawyers outside the sphere of legal ethics. For example, in legal
education, the central focus on the common law and the case method is
explicitly premised on the notion that the core legal skills involve complex,
creative judgment rather than mechanical rule following.
And most strikingly, the treatment of professional judgment for the
purposes of negligence liability to clients presupposes complex, creative
judgment. The law of negligence holds professionals to a "standard of care"
that represents a set of collectively defined but uncodified and partially
unwritten general norms whose application to particular situations is
4. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 3-5 (1980).

assumed to require the reflective judgment of a qualified practitioner. In
this realm, we do not permit professionals to exonerate themselves simply
by pointing to the absence of any formally promulgated rule unambiguously condemning the particular conduct in question.
When we turn to the realm of professional responsibility, however, a
different perspective dominates. The field consists predominantly of exegesis of the two disciplinary codes, and these days, primarily the Model
Rules. Now one might object that the focus on the codes implies that the
lawyer's main concern is avoiding sanctions, which seems inconsistent with
the kind of internalized disposition to serve justice that one associates with
professionalism. But this is not the most important objection to the
disciplinary rule conception, and indeed the criticism is not entirely fair-a
considerable portion of both codes is not concerned with norms that are
strictly disciplinary rules. The critical objection is that the codes obviate
complex, creative judgment and thus subvert the vital aspirations of
professionalism.
The codes replicate within themselves the two dominant conceptions
described earlier. On the one hand, there are norms designed for disciplinary enforcement prohibiting specified conduct. Although the drafters of
the Model Rules describe these norms as "rules of reason," 5 most of them in
fact have a rigid, categorical character that leaves little room for judgment,
and in fact these norms were designed, as one drafter put it, "to provide a
black letter rule for every case."16 On the other hand, we find a set of norms
that effectively grant broad, unreviewable autonomy to lawyers to consult
their personal values. These norms are typically contentless; they make no
effort to suggest how the decisions that fall under them might be made
other than in terms of the lawyer's subjective predispositions.
The Code differs from the Model Rules in one interesting respect. It does
contain a set of norms called "Ethical Considerations" that are neither
mechanical rules nor invitations to consult personal values. These norms do
in fact invoke the kind of complex, creative judgment associated with the
professional ideal, though their practical effect was severely limited by the
rigid commands of the Code's disciplinary rules. The abandonment of such
norms in the Model Rules reflects the increasing influence of the disciplinary
rule and personal morality conceptions.
Perhaps the two most important norms in the Model Rules are those
concerning confidentiality and withdrawal. The first is an example of the
rigid, mechanical disciplinary rule. The lawyer is forbidden to disclose
adverse client information except in two narrowly specified exceptional
situations.7 Outside the exceptions, the lawyer has no authority to balance
considerations that favor disclosure against the values of confidentiality,
even when confidentiality perpetuates grotesque injustice. The withdrawal

5. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Scope (1983).
6. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 571, 574 (1982).
7. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983).
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rule is an example of a contentless norm that simply defers to personal
values. With a few narrowly specified exceptions, the lawyer is authorized
to withdraw whenever he finds the client's objective "repugnant. '8 The
lawyer has no obligation to consider the extent to which withdrawal would
cause injustice.
(In passing, we should note the political consequences of the Model Rules
on confidentiality and withdrawal: the general prohibition of disclosure
cements the lawyer's subordination to wealthy clients by depriving her of
the only effective leverage she has to curb unjust conduct by the client,
while the relegation of withdrawal issues to personal morality enables her to
dominate poor clients by authorizing the lawyer to condition continued
representation on compliance with her wishes.)
I/
Although the confidentiality rule is primarily disciplinary in character, it
also incorporates the personal morality perspective. The rigid disciplinary
prohibitions are accompanied by two types of exception, one permitting
disclosure when necessary for some interest of the lawyer herself and the
other permitting it when necessary to save a third person from "death or
substantial bodily injury" resulting from a client's criminal act. 9 This second
exception, which covers some of the most compelling ethical issues, does
not give rise to an obligation to disclose or even to consider doing so. The
rules simply give the lawyer permission to disclose; they state that she
"may"do so but provide no criteria for such decisions and make clear that
the decisions are not subject to disciplinary review.
The rule on organizational clients makes explicit one of the more
extreme implications of the permssive, personal perspective: Even when
the lawyer is "certain" that the organization's officers are committed to an
illegal act that will injure the organization, the lawyer has no obligation to
withdraw, much less to disclose; she simply "may" withdraw. 10 Thus, the
lawyer's disclosure obligations are defined on the one hand by a rigid,
mechanical rule and on the other by a contentless norm deferring to
personal concerns.
Now the codes do contain some norms that call for complex, creative
judgment. For example, the Model Rule on fees provides that "[a] lawyer's
fee shall be reasonable" and then sets out a list of illustrative factors to be
considered in assessing reasonableness." Such rules, however, do not
concern the most intensely debated and challenging issues of legal ethicsthose that turn on questions of justice between the client and third parties
or the public. For example, even if accompanied by elaborate explication
and illustration, a norm obligating lawyers to make disclosures when
"reasonable" in the light of both client and third party interests or when
"necessary to avoid substantial injustice" would be hard to imagine within
the confines of the current ethical codes, even though such general,

8. Id., Rule 1.16(b)(3).
9. Id., Rule 1.6(b).
10. Id., Rule 1.13(b), (c).
11. Id., Rule 1.5.

open-ended norms typically govern equally important matters in the
12
professional liability area.
My point is not that the relegation of legal ethical issues to mechanical
rules on the one hand and personal morality on the other results in
relatively poor decisions on such issues (though in fact I think this is the
case). Rather, the point for now is that this practice accounts for the failure
of legal ethics to respond to the aspirations people bring to it. For the
practice leaves no role in confronting the most compelling issues of legal
ethics for the kind of complex, creative judgment that people associate with
fulfilling aspects of professionalism.
The important aspect of this judgment is notjust that it is demanding or
intellectually challenging but that in linking particular technical concerns to
broad social values, it enables the practitioner to experience the resolution
of particular problems as vindicating universal interests. In contrast, under
a regime of alternatively mechanical and subjective norms the practitioner
repeatedly experiences his client's and his own concerns as alien from more
general social interests.
Now it may be that there are practical reasons why norms encouraging
complex, creative judgment are not feasible to govern many issues of legal
ethics. Perhaps lawyers lack the aptitude, the information, or the integrity
to make judgments of this kind. Perhaps something close to absolute,
categorical protection of confidentiality is necessary to give clients adequate
inducement to consult lawyers. I do not find such arguments at all
plausible, and I am amazed, given how readily lawyers make them, how
little systematic investigation or even articulation lawyers have given
them.' 3 But my point is that, if such arguments are true, they represent a
tragedy that their proponents have failed to acknowledge.
The tragedy is that the professional aspiration to connect directly a
commitment to general social values with everyday practical tasks is
doomed to disappointment. The ethically ambitious lawyer comes to the
profession attracted to the idea that she will contribute to justice in her
day-to-day practice but then finds that her practice is governed by norms
that frequently oblige her to do things that, if she dares to consider the
issue, she believes are unjust. Moreover, even when she has the autonomy
to do what she thinks would contribute to justice, the profession often treats
her decision as a personal, subjective concern for which it accords her
immunity but neither guidance nor support.
The best answer the profession has to the lawyer's disappointment is to
adopt the perspective of the long run: however alienating in the particular
case, requiring the lawyer to acquiesce in injustice or leaving her to her
subjective devices may be a necessary part of the regime that in the long run
12. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer As Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to
Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1177-81 (1985) (arguing for ethical norms

requiring disclosure "to prevent serious harm").
13. For responses to these and other objections to professional responsibility regimes
requiring complex, creative judgment, together with illustrations of how such regimes
might be elaborated, see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1083 (1988).
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produces the most socially desirable or just decisions. But this answer, even
if true, is not fully responsive to the disappointment I am discussing. The
custodians and designers of virtually every social role can and do claim that
ultimately and in the long run the role serves public values. The distinctive
ethically appealing feature of professional roles has been a vision of practice
that links in a challenging and immediate way public values and the
resolution of particular problems. Once the argument shifts to the long
run, the professional promise has already been betrayed.

